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• Problems in the banking system are at the core of the current crisis. The esta-
blishment of a banking union is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for
eventual crisis resolution that respects the integrity of the euro.
• The European Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism and related reform of the European Banking Authority (EBA) do
not and cannot create a fully-fledged banking union, but represent a broadly ade-
quate step on the basis of the leaders’ declaration of 29 June 2012 and of the
decision to use Article 127(6) of the treaty as legal basis.
• The proposal rightly endows the European Central Bank (ECB) with broad autho-
rity over all banks within the supervisory mechanism’s geographical perimeter;
however, the status of non-euro area member states willing to participate in this
mechanism, and the governance and decision-making processes of the ECB in
this respect, call for further elaboration. Further adjustments are also desirable
in the proposed reform of the EBA, even though they must probably retain a stop-
gap character pending the more substantial review planned in 2014. 
Nicolas Véron (nicholas.veron@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel and
Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. This Policy
Contribution was prepared as a briefing paper for the European Parliament
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee’s Monetary Dialogue. The views
expressed are those of the author(s) alone. Copyright remains with the European
Parliament at all times.
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THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL ASPECTS OF THE
CRISIS in the euro area were at least partly
understood early on, but it has taken more time to
reach a (still incomplete, but meaningful)
consensus on the importance of dynamics in the
banking sector for understanding crisis
developments. The ‘doom loop’ linking sovereign
and banking credit conditions has been correctly
identified as a key transmission channel that
needs to be addressed to prevent further
deterioration and so that eventual improvements
can be envisaged. This makes it imperative for
European policymakers to include the creation of
a banking union in their broader vision for crisis
management and resolution.
Given the intrinsic interdependencies between
banking policy and fiscal policy, and the
limitations of the existing common policy
framework for fiscal matters, it is impossible to
create this banking union in one single step. The
creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)
is an important move that will not complete the
creation of a European banking union, but may be
its cornerstone and could also, crucially and under
the terms of the euro-area summit statement of
29 June 20121, enable the direct intervention of
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and thus
a major improvement in the effectiveness of
Europe’s crisis management strategy for dealing
with the banking aspects of the crisis.
As with fiscal policy, there is a strong
interdependence between banking policy and
monetary policy, which has motivated the choice
of the European Central Bank (ECB) as central
actor of the SSM, and the use of Article 127(6) as
the legal basis for the SSM’s establishment.
However, banking policy and monetary policy
should and will remain separate, which also
justifies allowing the SSM to cover more EU
member states than only those participating in
the euro area. The European Commission’s
proposal published on 12 September 2012 goes
in this direction as it introduces the possibility of
“close supervisory cooperation” between such
member states and the SSM, though a more
inclusive approach that permits those member
states to become effective members of the SSM
(and participants in its collective governance and
decision-making) would be preferable.
The Commission’s proposal rightly endows the
ECB with sweeping authority over all banks within
the SSM’s geographical perimeter, which is a
proper application of the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality given the policy aims of the
SSM’s establishment. However, more
decentralisation of decision-making may be
sought for macro-prudential policy decisions; and
safeguard mechanisms may be provided for non-
euro area member states that participate in the
SSM. In terms of governance and accountability,
the Commission’s proposal would benefit from
further elaboration, including: the creation of a
more compact decision-making body for
individual supervisory decisions, which should
not be subject to diplomatic balances among
member states; more direct accountability to the
Council and European Parliament, including for
appointments; and more direct inclusion of non-
euro area member states participating in the SSM
in governance and decision-making, even if Article
127(6) implies that ultimate authority must reside
with the ECB’s Governing Council.
Reform of the European Banking Authority (EBA)
should go further than the current proposal to
address legitimate concerns of non-euro area
member states, even if this comes at the price of
slightly more difficult EBA decision-making, at
least until the review planned in 2014. Finally, a
careful consideration of priorities in the legislative
agenda for the coming months is suggested. 
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BACKGROUND AND AIMS
On 29 June 2012, the heads of state and govern-
ment of euro-area countries issued a statement
starting with: “We affirm that it is imperative to
break the vicious circle between banks and sov-
ereigns. The Commission will present Proposals
on the basis of Article 127(6) for a single supervi-
sory mechanism”. On 12 September 2012, the
European Commission published three docu-
ments (here referred to as the Commission’s pro-
posals): (1) a communication titled A Roadmap
towards a Banking Union; (2) a proposal for a
Council regulation based on Article 127(6), to
create the Single Supervisory Mechanism with a
central role conferred on the ECB; and (3) a pro-
posal for a regulation of the European Parliament
and the Council to amend the 2010 regulation
establishing the EBA in order to adapt it to the cre-
ation of the SSM. 
This Policy Contribution assesses the
Commission’s proposals and provides
recommendations to help inform the European
public policy debate. Given the complexity of the
issue, some arguments have been summarised
and only the main policy options have been
specifically considered. 
THE CONTEXT: SINGLE SUPERVISORY
MECHANISM AND EUROPEAN BANKING UNION
The expression ‘banking union’ is used here to
refer to a policy framework that locates key
instruments of banking policy at European level
to enable the formation and maintenance of an
integrated European banking system. The notion
that banking union is an important and
indispensable component of any strategy to
prevent an unraveling of the euro area has gained
remarkable momentum since April 2012, as
reflected by the 29 June euro-area statement.
However, the banking union agenda cannot be
considered in isolation from the broader crisis
resolution agenda. The late-June report by the
President of the European Council, Towards a
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genuine economic and monetary union (Van
Rompuy, 2012), provides an important and
relevant reference for this agenda, with four key
‘building blocks’. These are often referred to in the
public debate as banking union, fiscal union,
competitiveness union and political union2.
The long journey towards banking union
Banking union, as defined above, constitutes a
major overhaul of Europe’s financial and economic
policy framework. The radical nature of this
endeavour must not be underestimated, and it
would be unrealistic to try to achieve it in one
single move. The creation of the SSM, as outlined
in the statement of 29 June and developed in the
Commission’s proposals, can only be seen as the
first step on a long journey that is set to include
other changes to Europe’s institutional setting and
policies, as well as concrete crisis management
measures that will have a major impact on the
future structures of Europe’s banking system. The
fact that the creation of the SSM does not
immediately lead to a fully consistent and
complete banking policy framework should be
considered an unavoidable consequence of the
ambition and complexity of the banking union
project, and of its fundamental part in Europe’s
broader fourfold agenda.
Banking union, fiscal union, political union
In particular, there are strong interdependencies
between banking union, fiscal union and political
union that rule out the possibility of completing a
European banking union without considerable
prior progress on the two other components, a
condition that is currently not met. A fully-fledged
banking union requires an autonomous European
resolution authority and a federal European
deposit insurance system, both of which require
some sufficient form of backstop from a European
level of fiscal authority to acquire credibility3. The
fiscal union that could provide the backstop, in
turn, is difficult to envisage without a political
union that would at least partly remedy the
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2. See, among others, Véron
(2012a) on the fourfold
agenda; Pisani-Ferry, Sapir,
Véron and Wolff (2012) on
banking union; Marzinotto,
Sapir and Wolff (2011) on
fiscal union; and Véron
(2012b) on political union.
3. An early version of this




between banking union and
fiscal union.
‘Banking union constitutes a major overhaul of Europe’s financial and economic policy
framework. It would be unrealistic to try to achieve it in one single move. The creation of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism can only be seen as the first step.’
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4. An early advocacy of this
approach is in Posen and
Véron (2009).
5. This issue is further
explored in Pisani-Ferry,
Sapir, Véron and Wolff
(2012).
“structural democratic deficit” of the EU
institutions (Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany, 2009).
In other words, further progress on the path
towards fiscal union, including a less limited and
more robust framework for jointly-issued securi-
ties than with under the present ESM, and towards
political union, including a political setting that
would make it possible to back such joint
issuance with a credible prospect of future rev-
enue, is required for a completion of European
banking union that would compellingly meet the
heads of state and government’s' objective “to
break the vicious circle between banks and sov-
ereigns”. Without such progress, the European
interbank market will remain impaired by the per-
ception of credit risk on some but not all of the sov-
ereign securities that provide the collateral of
reference; credit rating agencies will not be able
to lift the ‘sovereign cap’ that keeps the creditwor-
thiness measure of banks at most equal to that of
their home member state; and the incentives that
prompted many European banks to amass con-
siderable portfolios of sovereign securities issued
by their home member state, and to engage in
more abrupt deleveraging outside of the country
than inside, will remain largely in place.
In the author’s assessment and on the basis of the
29 June statement, the Commission’s proposals
go about as far as possible in the direction of
banking union at this stage, given these current
limitations on other major aspects of the European
policy and political agenda.
SSM and a European approach to bank crisis
management
The 29 June statement reads: “When an effective
single supervisory mechanism is established,
involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the
ESM could, following a regular decision, have the
possibility to recapitalise banks directly”. Thus,
the effective establishment of the SSM is specified
as a precondition for what in practice means a
partial transfer of the responsibility for bank crisis
management and resolution from the national to
the European level through the ESM.
Such a transfer is arguably a necessary and
urgent condition to address Europe’s banking
system fragility4. Delay, all things being equal,
inevitably adds to the eventual cost of crisis
resolution. By making it conditional on the
effective establishment of the SSM, the heads of
state and government have created an intriguing
link between the parallel agendas of supervisory
institution-building and bank crisis management.
It could be argued that this condition was not
indispensable and adds rigidity and delay to the
overall crisis reaction framework. Conversely, it is
understandable that the leaders would have
desired the SSM to provide institutional continuity
in to a European bank crisis management and
resolution process that promises to be complex
and protracted. The Commission’s proposals
respect this sequence by not taking any specific
position on the crisis management actions that
may be considered once the SSM is in place.
The euro area, non-euro area countries and the
single market
The geographical perimeter of the SSM and bank-
ing union cannot yet be considered a settled ques-
tion. The initial political initiative, as expressed in
the 29 June 2012 statement, came from  euro-
area member states, even though it was endorsed
the same day by the European Council. But while
the  euro-area crisis clearly triggered the move
towards banking union, the treaty-enshrined aim
of a single market for banking services, combined
with significant levels of banking-sector integra-
tion between euro area and non-euro area EU
member states, mean that all EU member states
should take part in the discussion about the
establishment of the SSM. This would imply a
slightly different framework than in the Commis-
sion’s proposal, which reserves SSM membership
to  euro-area member states and only allows an
option of “close supervisory cooperation” for other
EU member states.
There are technical arguments in favour of having,
as much as possible, the same perimeters for
banking union and monetary union5. However,
given, on the one hand, that the SSM falls short of
a full banking union and in particular does not
include at this stage a common system of deposit
insurance, and on the other hand, the fact that the
euro area can be joined by all EU member states
EUROPE’S SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM Nicolas Véron
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banking union with adequate rights and
responsibilities. This also potentially limits
options in terms of the supervisor’s accountability
to political authorities and the European public,
and of ring-fencing the independence of monetary
policy from the distinct constraints of supervisory
policy. These aspects are further examined in the
next section of this Policy Contribution. 
SSM DESIGN BASED ON ARTICLE 127(6)
This section is based on the European
Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation
conferring specific tasks on the European Central
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions, COM (2012)
511, published on 12 September 2012.
Geographical perimeter
The proposal suggests that the geographical
perimeter of the SSM is the euro area, and adds the
possibility of “close supervisory cooperation” for
those non-euro area member states that desire it.
As argued above, this may be seen as not
inclusive enough given the possible legitimate
aspiration of non-euro area countries to
participate in the future banking union. The SSM
must include all  euro-area member states, as in
the current proposal, but should also include the
possibility of actual membership for other EU
member states that desire to participate, as some
are likely to do. The SSM regulation may specify
the process through which non-euro area member
states would voluntarily become part of the SSM,
including possibly the adoption of adequate
domestic legislation.
In the same spirit, the termination of SSM
membership should be seen as a political rather
than technical decision. As a consequence it
should be subjected to a high threshold and be a
responsibility of the European Council, rather than
of the ECB as suggested in the current proposal
(Article 6.5). 
Mandate and powers
The proposal confers on the ECB broad powers to
supervise banks based within the SSM’s
geographical perimeter, to access relevant
that comply with its admission criteria, the EU
should adopt an approach that opens participation
in the SSM to all member states that desire it, with
an adequate balance of rights and responsibilities.
Inclusiveness and flexibility are in order – even
though at least one EU member state, the United
Kingdom, has made it clear that it will not
participate in the SSM.
It may be relevant in this respect to notice that
while the  euro area represents the vast majority of
the EU’s banking assets, the UK represents the
vast majority of banking assets in the rest of the
EU, as illustrated by Figure 1.
The  29 June euro-area statement refers to Article
127(6) for the establishment of the SSM. This
article reads: “The Council, acting by means of
regulations in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, may unanimously, and
after consulting the European Parliament and the
European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon
the European Central Bank concerning policies
relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and other financial institutions with
the exception of insurance undertakings”. This
implies unanimity on the part of EU member
states, ie each non-euro area member state has a
veto. Simultaneously, it implies that the European
supervisor at the centre of the SSM is the ECB
itself, which potentially makes it more difficult to
include non-euro area member states in the









Figure 1: Total assets of credit institutions in EU
member states
Source: ECB. Note: data for June 2011.
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information, and to take appropriate remedial
action. This is appropriate and necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of the SSM. The
experience of the EBA in 2011-12 suggests that
the objectives of the SSM cannot be attained if the
main supervisory authority remains at the
member-state level. Furthermore, the proposal
makes appropriate provisions to enable existing
national supervisory authorities to carry out a
significant share of the actual supervisory tasks
and assessments, in an adequate relationship
with the ECB so that the ECB retains ultimate
authority.
One possible exception, however, relates to
macro-prudential policy instruments, including
the ability to impose additional prudential buffers
on banks related to national credit conditions.
Article 4.1(d) of the proposal appears to centralise
such decisions at ECB level. While coordination by
the ECB is certainly in order, further capacity for
initiative by national authorities in this matter
would be more consistent with the principles
suggested by the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) in the context of the legislative discussion
on capital requirements (ESRB, 2012).
Also, non-euro area member states participating
in the SSM may be granted a greater degree of
autonomy from the decisions of the central
supervisor than euro-area member states, in order
to take into account interactions with their
national monetary and fiscal policies, including
the fact that they are not covered by the ESM. This
could take the form of a safeguard clause that
could be invoked, with due justification and an
appropriate procedure, to limit the direct
application of ECB decisions as currently set out
in Article 6 of the proposal.
Banks brought under the SSM’s authority
The proposal includes all euro-area based banks
and credit institutions within the SSM’s scope of
authority. This is consistent with the heads of
state and governments’ stated aim “to break the
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.
This aim cannot be attained if significant sections
of individual member states’ banking systems
remain within a purely national policy framework,
even if these sections are composed of small or
medium-sized banks. Thus, the Commission’s
proposal on this aspect is based on a rigorous
application of the principle of subsidiarity in
accordance with the stated policy objective.
Governance, accountability and independence
One lesson from the EBA experience is that gover-
nance arrangements matter greatly to the success
of a newly established supervisory authority at
the European level. In this area, the Commission’s
proposal has scope for improvement.
A debate has started over the desirable
relationship between the SSM and the ECB. The
ECB is widely viewed as a strong and credible
institution, and it is understandable that this
credibility should be leveraged to the benefit of
the new SSM. Furthermore, there are multiple
connections between monetary policy and
supervisory policy, not least in the operation of
the ECB’s function as lender-of-last-resort to the
euro-area banking system. Also, the use of Article
127(6) explicitly implies vesting the European
level of supervisory authority in the ECB. However,
supervision might involve individual decisions
with high political impact and its medium-term
compatibility with an independent conduct of
monetary policy is open to question. This would
suggest that the European supervisor should have
more autonomy vis-à-vis the ECB, and more
accountability to political authorities at the EU
level, than is the case in the Commission’s
proposal. An optimal response to all these
considerations requires careful fine-tuning and
institutional creativity.
A useful guiding vision could be to consider the
medium-term relationship between the ECB and
the SSM along the lines of that between the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) and the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in Basel, even
though evidently with a very different set of
institutional constraints and responsibilities. The
BIS hosts and finances the FSB but there is
considerable autonomy, and the more political
nature of the FSB does not encroach on the
independence of the BIS. Partly for reasons of
expediency, the FSB started operations without
an autonomous legal personality or independent
funding, but there is now a discussion to modify
EUROPE’S SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM Nicolas Véron
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6. A comparable setup with
an Executive Board of nine
members is proposed in Car-
massi, Di Noia and Micossi
(2012).
these features. Similarly, and especially in the
context of possible future treaty changes, in a
longer-term perspective the ECB could be
considered the incubator of a European
supervisory function that may gradually gain
autonomy. This however is not possible currently
given the decision to base it on Article 127(6).
At present, improvements that may be considered
could include:
• Identifying the supervisory function within the
ECB under a specific name (such as ‘European
Banking Supervisor’), which would mark its
separation from the rest of the ECB’s activities; 
• Replacing the currently proposed (and
confusingly named) ‘supervisory board’ with a
two-tier structure6:
• A compact SSM executive board, comprising
between five and nine members to make
effective supervisory decisions affecting
individual credit institutions in the European
interest; 
• A larger prudential council that would
include representatives of national
supervisors, including those of non-euro
area member states participating in the SSM;
the latter may have a reduced voting weight
as a quid pro quo for their higher degree of
autonomy, as suggested above. The
prudential council would exercise oversight
over the action of the SSM executive board
on individual cases, and decide on broader
matters of policy, such as the positions
recommended by the ECB in the elaboration
of binding technical standards at the EBA.
This setup would ensure the indispensable
effectiveness of individual supervisory deci-
sions that should not be held up by the bal-
ancing of national interests in diplomatic
negotiations, while safeguarding the inter-
ests and engagement of all participating
member states in setting supervisory policy.
In turn, both the SSM executive board and
prudential council should be adequately
‘The consolidation of the supervisory frameworks of at least 17 member states under the ECB's
authority disrupts the fledgling institutional balance of the EBA. Incremental, ad-hoc
adjustments should keep the functioning of the EBA viable until the 2014 review’.
subjected to the ultimate authority of the
ECB’s Governing Council. 
• Making the appointment process for the
members of SSM executive board more akin to
that of the members of the ECB’s own executive
board (ie, by the European Council after
consultation with the European Parliament),
while keeping the proposal’s provision that the
chair should be one of the ECB’s executive
board members. However, it is unclear why the
vice chair should be a central banker selected
by and from the ECB’s Governing Council
(Article 19.2 of the proposal); 
• Extending the possible length of tenure of the
Board’s members including its chair, as the
currently proposed maximum of five years non-
renewable (Article 19.7) appears exceedingly
short and not in line with international good
practice. 
EBA REFORM
This section is based on the European
Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and the Council amending
regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (...), COM (2012)
512, published on 12 September 2012.
The consolidation of the supervisory frameworks
of at least 17 member states under the authority
of the ECB has a disruptive impact on the fledgling
institutional balance of the EBA. It is unlikely that
fully consistent responses to the corresponding
institutional challenges can be found in the cur-
rent phase of reform, especially given the lingering
uncertainty about major elements of Europe’s
future banking policy framework. Thus, it appears
reasonable at this stage to adopt incremental, ad-
hoc adjustments that keep the functioning of the
EBA viable if not optimal in the immediate future,
and to delay any further fundamental changes
until the planned 2014 review of the three Euro-
pean Supervisory Authorities. This is broadly the
approach adopted in the Commission’s proposal.
Nicolas Véron  EUROPE’S SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
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However, even under this ‘stopgap’ approach, the
Commission does not appear to have gone far
enough to address the legitimate concerns of
member states that would not participate in the
SSM. In principle, authorities of SSM member
states that vote in the EBA’s Supervisory Board
retain their autonomy, but in practice, it is likely
that coordination will be sought so that their votes
are in line with policies adopted by the SSM as a
whole. In particular, according to the proposal, it
will be very difficult for non-euro area member
states to oppose a position that would be shared
by all SSM member states (even assuming that
the geographical perimeter of the SSM is limited to
the current euro area) in a decision made by
qualified majority voting (QMV).
One way to overcome this obstacle would be to
subject such decisions, including the approval of
binding technical standards, to a higher threshold
of majority than the usual EU QMV formula. Other
similar adjustments may be in order in other areas
of the EBA’s activity, including decisions on
binding mediation, actions in emergency
situations and appointment decisions. All things
being equal, such adjustments might make it
more difficult to reach the voting threshold and
thus may have a negative impact on the quality of
EBA decision-making, but this could be seen as an
inevitable consequence of the creation of the SSM,
at least until the 2014 review. 
OTHER LEGISLATION CURRENTLY UNDER
CONSIDERATION BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
In its Communication COM (2012) 510, A roadmap
towards a banking union, published on 12
September 2012, the European Commission links
the establishment of the SSM and EBA reform to
the adoption “before the end of 2012” of three
additional pieces of legislation, namely on capital
requirements (proposal of July 2011), deposit
guarantee schemes (proposal of July 2010) and
recovery and resolution tools for banks in crisis
(proposal of June 2012). It also indicates that “the
Commission envisages notably making a
proposal for a single resolution mechanism which
would govern the resolution of banks and
coordinate in particular the application of
resolution tools to banks within the banking
union”. Furthermore, the conclusions of the High-
Level Expert Group on possible reforms to the
structure of the EU banking sector, chaired by
Bank of Finland Governor Erkki Liikanen, could
give rise to additional legislative projects7.
These various legislative processes, however,
should be considered with different degrees of
urgency. A natural sequence would be to prioritise
the legislation on capital requirements, not least
because of the deadline of January 2013 for the
start of implementation of the Basel III Accord. On
the other aspects, it would be natural to envisage
reconsideration in the new context created by the
prospect of a European banking union.
Specifically, the issue of recovery and resolution
tools could be examined together with the
Commission’s future proposal on a single
resolution mechanism, which one would expect
might be published in the course of 2013; and the
reform of deposit guarantee schemes can be
delayed until a clarification of how the issue of
deposit insurance is to be addressed on a
supranational basis in the future banking union
framework. Such rescheduling of course would be
without prejudice to the possible adoption of
legislation on special resolution regimes and/or
reform of deposit insurance systems in individual
member states, which may be imposed by
circumstances on an emergency basis, and for
which the above-mentioned EU legislative
proposals may provide a source of inspiration, if
not a binding framework. 
CONCLUSION
It is to be hoped that a workable compromise for
the initial establishment of the SSM based on
Article 127(6) and corresponding EBA reform can
be reached in the next few weeks. Energetic steps
towards a resolution of Europe’s current banking
fragility are urgently needed, and the euro-area
summit statement of 29 June makes the effective
establishment of the SSM a precondition for such
steps. The cost to Europe’s citizens of further delay
could be extremely significant, not only in
financially but also politically and socially.
The bulk of the Commission’s proposal can thus be
supported, though improvements should be
insisted on, particularly on the accountability of
the future European supervisory function within
7. The report was published
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the ECB; inclusiveness of the SSM vis-à-vis non-
euro area member states that desire to participate
in the banking union; and further safeguards for
non-euro area member states in the ad-hoc reform
of the EBA, pending the 2014 review which could
result in more fundamental changes.
The establishment of the SSM is only one step on
a longer path towards European banking union,
which itself cannot be considered in isolation from
the challenges of fiscal union and political union.
Losing the current momentum for the completion
of this early step would be unfortunate, not only
in itself but because it would reinforce the
European public’s and global investors’ doubts
about the ability of European leaders to make
effective decisions. The 29 June statement
contains a promise of supervisory integration and
centralised bank crisis management. Europe’s
leaders now need to deliver on this promise if they
are to maintain, or regain, the trust of their
constituents.
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